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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 9331

vs.

LEO BARRETT STEWART, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACT
The above entitled case came on for hearing on
the 7th day of June, 1960, before the Honorable
A. H. Ellett, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant
was charged in the information of the crime of negligent homicide in violation of Title 41, Chapter 6,
Section 43.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as enacted by the laws of Utah in 1955, and as amended
by the laws of Utah in 1957, as follows, to wit:
"That the said Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. on or about
the 9th day of March, 1959, in the County of Salt
1
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Lake, State of Utah, being then and there a person
operating a vehicle, to-wit, a 1956 GMC pickup
truck, did then and there unlawfully and negligently
drive said vehicle with reckless disregard for the
safety of others, and did then and there inflict injury by the driving of said vehicle upon a person,
to-wit, Paul Weddington, thereby proximately causing his death, which death ensued within one year
of said injury." (R. 8) The jury found defendant
guilty as charged on June 7, 1960, and notice of
appeal was filed on June 24, 1960.
Officer Norris K. Johnson of the Salt Lake City
Police Department was called and testified for the
State as follows: That he was one of the investigating officers; that on the 9th day of March, 1959,
he was called to the scene of an accident at 21st
South and 9th East Street, Salt Lake City, Utah;
that he arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 7 :57 A.M. On his arrival he found a
pickup truck and a passenger car had collided; that
they were in approximately the position as shown
on Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-7. The deceased, Paul
Weddington, was the driver of the Plymouth automobile; defendant, Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr., was
the driver of the truck. At the time of the accident
Mr. Weddington was alone in the passenger car and
defendant Stewart was the sole occupant of the
pickup truck. The measurements as set forth on said
2
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two Exhibits were made by Officer Norris K. Johnson.
Officer Johnson testified that he could find
no skid marks from either vehicle ( R. 36) . Officer
Johnson also identified the Exhibits P-2, 3, 4, 5 and
6, showing the vehicles involved in the accident, and
also P-3 showing the intersection at 9th East and
21st South Street looking to the west, and Exhibit
P-2, the same intersection, looking to the south.
The photographs, Officers Johnson admitted, were
taken four days after the accident and were introduced merely to show the general nature of the intersection itself ( R. 38) . Officer Johnson testified
that the single semaphore at said intersection was
working at the time he arrived at the scene of the
accident. Officer Johnson testified that he found
a Mr. Taylor, a witness to the accident; that in the
presence of Officer Johnson and Mr. Taylor and
defendant Stewart, Mr. Taylor stated that Mr. Stewart had run the red light; further, Officer Johnson
testified that Mr. Stewart did not reply or say anything to said remark made by Mr. Taylor (R. 39).
Officer Johnson also read the statement that Mr.
Stewart gave to him at the time of the accident.
"Mr. Stewart states, I was going west on 21st
South. The last time I had looked at the light it was
green; that was about 150 feet approximately before
the intersection. I never even saw the other car
3
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until I was in the intersection and then it was too
late. I was in the middle lane at the time." (R. 40).
He further stated that defendant Stewart told him
that defendant Stewart was traveling at approximately 30 m.p.h. at the time of the accident (R. 40).
That the distance of danger when Stewart realized
there was going to be an accident was approximately
10 feet ( R. 40). The light sequence for the semaphore for the lights facing to the east on 21st South
was determined by Officer Johnson to be as follows:
a five-second yellow light thirty-second red light
and a thirty-five second green light (R. 41). Officer
Johnson also testified that at the time of the accident, approximately 7 :4'5 A.M., the sun was just
above the mountains and shining westerly down
21st South (R. 41-42). Officer Johnson also testified that he had made investigation of other accidents at this intersection and that in his report in
the investigation of this particular accident of Mr.
Stewart's, he listed as one of the possible factors
in this accident the sun obscuring the light in the
semaphore ( R. 42) .
"Q. Isn't it a fact that in your report
in your investigation of this accident you
listed as one of the possible factors in this
accident the sun obscuring the light semaphore?
"A. I stated that the sun was shining
directly on the semaphore, it possibly might
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have had an effect on the vision of the driver."
(R. 42).
On cross-examination ( R. 43) Officer Johnson
was asked the following question:
"Q. Did you ever have any other conversations with Mr. Stewart when Mr. Taylor
was present other than the one you just told
us about?
"A. Not that I can remember.
"Q. Do you remember Mr. Stewart in
that conversation and in the presence of Mr.
T·aylor making a statement to this effect:
'That man ran the red light directly in front
of me, or something to that effect?'

Objection to the question was made by the State
and the court refused to allow the Officer to answer
the question (R. 43-44). Further at R. 44 counsel
for defendant on cross-examination, asked Officer
Johnson:
"Q. One other question, Officer Johnson, this intersection - or Officer Johnson
- excuse me - this intersection at 9th East
and 21st South is one of the most dangerous
intersections in the city, is it not?"
The court refused to allow Officer Johnson to
answer that question (R. 44). Officer Johnson did
testify that he had attended or investigated several
accidents at this particular intersection (R. 44-45).
Further he testified that there had been many accidents at this particular intersection (R. 45).
5
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With reference to the position of the victim,
Paul Weddington, as shown on Exhibits P-7 and
P-1, there was uncertainty as to whether or not the
position of the victim as shown on said exhibits was
the actual position where the victim was after the
accident. Police Officer Colbert of the Salt Lake
City Police Department testified that it was customary prior to removing a victim, such as Mr.
Weddington, to make a chalk mark around the body
indicating the location where he was at the time.
However, in this particular case that was not done.
Mr. Earl B. Taylor was called to testify on
behalf of the State. Mr. Taylor testified (R. 52,
53) : That on the morning of March 9, 1959, at
approximately 7:45 A.M. he was traveling south
on 9th East to his place of employment; that as he
approached the intersection of 9th East and 21st
South the light changed red before he reached it;
that there was another car stopped ahead of him
(R. 53). The car in front of him was the Weddington Plymouth automobile. He stated that they waited
for a few moments and the light changed green and
that immediately on the change of the light to green
the Plymouth automobile in front of him started
through the intersection ( R. 54). Mr. Taylor testified that he had pulled forward a little ahead of
where he had stopped and glanced to the east and
saw this truck coming through the intersection.
6
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That he stepped on his brakes and stopped his automobile in the cross-walk. That the truck came in
through the intersection and struck the Plymouth
automobile towards the middle section of the car
(R. 54). At the time Mr. Taylor first saw the pickup truck it was approximately two car lengths back
of the intersection; that there were two cars in the
left-turn lane going south or going west on 21st
South (R. 54). Further, that the driver of the pickup truck did not put on his brakes until just as he
hit the Plymouth automobile (R. 55). Mr. Taylor
testifed that Mr. Stewart after the accident walked
up towards him and stated: "I have often heard of
these kind of things, but this is the first time I have
been in one. That man ran right out in front of
me." Mr. Taylor testified that he CMr. Taylor)
replied, "You were wrong, because you came through
that red light." The defendant Stewart made no remark to that.
On cross-examination Mr. Taylor stated that
the Weddington Plymouth car came to a complete
stop at the intersection of 9th East and 21st Soutn
and that just the instant the light turned to green
the Weddington Plymouth automobile started up
fairly quick (R. 56). Mr. Taylor on cross-examination further testified that after his car had moved
forward just a matter of a few feet he had no difficulty in seeing the pickup truck coming from the
7
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left; that it didn't look like the pickup truck could
make a good stop if he did stop ·( R. 57) and for
that reason Mr. Taylor stopped his automobile. Mr.
Taylor further testified that the light that would
be facing the traffic coming from the east could not
be seen directly by him but that he could see when
the yellow light came on (R. 59).
It was stipulated and agreed in open court between the State and counsel for Defendant without
the necessity of having the attending physician testify, that Paul Edward Weddington, the victim, died
as a result of the accident; that the date of his
death was March 12, 1959.
Joanne Monroe testified for the State as follows: That on the morning of March 9, 1959, at
approximately 7 :45 A.M. she was on her way to
work at the Franklin School; she was proceeding
west on 21st South (R. 63) that she approached
the intersection of 21st South and 9th East; that
she proceeded to the righthand lane behind another
car preparatory to making a right hand turn from
2.1st South onto 9th East going north (R. 63). She
testified that the car in front of her and she had
come to a complete stop for the red light when she
noticed another car coming down the lane to her left
that wasn't stopping for the red light (R. 63). She
testified that she had been stopped for approximately
3 or 4 seconds; that the other car approaching on
8
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her left did not seem to be slowing down to stop for
the red light (R. 63). That the car on her left, the
pickup truck, proceeded into the intersection and
hit the Weddington Plymouth automobile; that the
Plymouth automobile was struck midsection by the
pickup truck ( R. 64). Mrs. Monroe testified that
she had been driving for approximately 9 years and
she estimated the speed of the pickup truck as 40
m.p.h. (R. 64) and that she did not notice any
slowing down or change of speed as the pickup
truck approached the intersection ( R. 64). She further testified: "I didn't notice that I had any difficulty in seeing the light" ( R. 64).
On cross-examination she stated:
"Q. Mrs. Monroe, were you the first
car to stop at this int~rsection, or were you
the second.
''A. There was a car in front of me.
I was the second one.
"Q. I see, so whether or not you noticed the light you would have stopped anyway because of the car in front of you,
wouldn't you?
''A. I am sure that's true, yes.
"Q. Do you think you were particularly
paying attention to the semaphore at that
time.
"A. I am quite certain I noticed it or
I wouldn't have thought he is going to run
the red light, which was my first thought.
9
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Mrs. Monroe on cross-examination testified
that she first noticed the pickup truck when it was
right along side her and followed it until it reached
the intersection (R. 65). That according to the
measurements she actually saw the pickup truck
for a distance of approximately 46 feet is it passed
her on the left ( R. 66) . Even though she only saw
the pickup for that distance, she still felt she was
able to determine the speed of the automobile. The
posted speed limit on 21st South going east and west
was established in court as 30 m.p.h. ( R. 66) . Mrs.
Monroe further testified that she did not know
who the driver was of the car in front of her; that
he must have made a right turn proceeding north
on 9th East Street (R. 67).
Mr. Douglas Hubbard, witness for the State,
testified that on the 9th of March, 1959, he was
proceeding north on 9th East Street at approximately 7:45 A.M. on his way to work. That his
wife accompanied him in the front seat of their
car (R. 68). That he was in the lane of traffic nearest the center line ( R. 69) . Just before he arrived
at the intersection the light turned yellow; he slowed
down and came to a stop and waited until the light
changed to red, that is, he waited through a yellow
light and a red light (R. 69). That after the light
turned green, he stated:

''Q. All right, now what happened after
the light turned green?
10
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A. After the light turned green - I
am in the habit of looking at traffic, I don't
trust the light, and as I looked to my right
I saw this pickup truck and he seemed to be
coming along at a fairly good speed and I
didn't think he was going to stop, and I had
crossed the lane about 3 feet approximately
so I stopped and the truck went in front of
me."
That the truck struck the gray Plymouth approximately in the midsection of the Plymouth. He
testified that he first saw the truck when it was
a few feet beyond the corner of Petty's Ford showroom, that is a little bit to the east of the west
corner (R. 70). Mr. Hubbard testified that the
truck was traveling close to 25 m.p.h. and as he
approached the cross lane he stepped on it, the
truck speeded up and at the point of impact was
traveling in his opinion approximately 30 m.p.h.,
that is he had increased his speed 5 m.p.h. That he
determined this from the sound of the motor and
the actual movement of the vehicle (R. 70-71). That
his vehicle was in the intersection no more than 3
feet at the time of the accident. On cross-examination Mr. Hubbard testified that he had used this
route on his way to work on prior occasions, and
that on prior occasions he had seen other cars run
the red light both at 9th East and 7th. At that point
.the State raised an objection and the court refused
to allow the witness to testify with respect to any
11
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further violations of the semaphores (R. 72). Mr.
Hubbard testified on cross-examination (R. 73)
that it was apparent the pickup truck was going to
proceed through the intersection and this was apparent to him when the truck was approximately
6 to 8 feet east of the east crosswalk. Mr. Hubbard
also testified with respect to the Weddington car,
(R. 7'3-76) :
"Q. Now, had he come to a cor.aplete
stop at that intersection before he started
(he is referring to the Weddington car).
"A. Yes, I happened to be watching as
he came to the intersection, and the light was
red for him and he slowed down more or less
getting ready to put on his brakes, and he had
stopped.
"Q. But you think he did stop.
''A. Oh, yes.
"Q. Do you remember having your
deposition taken here several months ago, and
didn't you in that deposition state that in
your opinion the Weddington car or this gray
Plymouth did not come to a complete stop?

"A. I don't remember for sure. That
was over a year ago.
"Q. Well, your recollection a year ago
would have been better than it is at the present time, wouldn't it, with respect to this
accident?
"A. Oh, when I gave my deposition I
was positive of every fact I stated, yes. '
1'2
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"Q. I see. Did you have occasion to observe the driver of this gray Plymouth, particularly whether he looked to the right or the
left in starting out into the intersection?
"A. Not to be sure, no.
"Q. Let me call your attention to the
25th day of September, 1959, at three fifty
o'clock p.m. You had your deposition taken,
did you not, before L. Reid Seely, a notary
public, up in the Executive Buirding? Do you
remember that?
"A. In the Insurance Building?
"Q. Well, maybe it was the Insurance
Building. I thought it was the Executive
Building.
"A. Could be.
"Q. Do you remember having your deposition taken at that time?
A. (Witness nods.)
"Q. Do you remember this question and
the answer that you gave to it: Question,
Now, where was Mr. Weddington's car when
you first observed it?
Answer, 'I glanced at him. I saw him
coming toward me slowly, on the other side
of the street. He was just crawling. I think
he saw the light was going to turn green,
probably, and he just crept along to save putting on his brakes. I believe he did put them
on before he hit there, but the light turned
green before he came anywhere near the
crosswalk.'
Question, 'What is your opinion as to
13
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how far north of the north crosswalk Mr.
Weddington's car was when the light changed
green, facing you?'
Answer, 'Oh, making a rough stab, I'd
say about fifteen or twenty feet.'
Question, 'And how fast was Mr. Weddington going at that time, in your opinion?
Answer, 'In my opinion, he'd be close to
a stall. He'd be going about ten to fifteen,
ten to twelve miles an hour.' "

* * * *
"Q. Calling your attention to one other
matter, Mr. Hubbard, with respect to your
deposition taken on the above date, and as
purely a matter to refresh your recollection
with reference to this question I asked you
about observing Mr. Weddington and whether
or not he looked to the right or to the left,
let me ask you if at that time in your deposition these were the questions and answers that
were given at that time: Question, 'Did you
observe which way he was looking before the
accident happened? Did you observe Mr. Weddington at all in his car?'
Answer, 'Just looking straight ahead. I
saw him just looking like that (indicating).
He was driving.'
"Do you remember that question and
your answer to it?
"A. I don't remember it now, but it
must have been correct at that time."
Further, on cross-examination at R. 76 the
following question was asked:
14
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"Q. Now, also, Mr. Hubbard, isn't it
a fact that you were particularly cautious of
this intersection because other cars prior to
this time had been running the red light in
front of you at this intersection?
A. No.
"Q. Let me call your attention to one
other factor in your deposition and see if this
doesn't refresh your recollection to "MR. BLACK: Just a minute. I have
already objected once to any evidence of prior
incidents of other cars at this intersection. I
believe it is immaterial.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Your Honor, I
didn't bring it out for that purpose, and I
made it specifically clear that I didn't.
"THE COUR'T: I think you have no
right to refresh his recollection unless he testifies now to something contrary to the way
he testified before.
''MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, he did. That
is what I am trying to bring out, Your Honor.
I asked what was the reason for his being
particularly cautious of this intersection. He
says, 'Well, just I don't want somebody to
hit me,' or something of that nature. The thing
I want to bring out is something entirely
contrary to that.
"THE COURT: May I see what you
are about to read to him?
(Judge looks at deposition.)
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: May the record
15
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show we would like to make a proffer of proof
on that?"
The proffer of proof made out of the presence
of the jury is found at page 80 of the Record, to-wit:
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Comes now the
defendant and excepts to the ruling of the
court with respect to the exclusion of the
testimony solicited of the witness Douglas
Hubbard in response to the question as towhat did he say?
"THE COURT: I know what he was
going to say. He was going to say people had
been running that red light in front of him
for a long time, and that's why he was solicitous of his own welfare.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, in response to the question of the counsel for the
defendant to the effect that - or as to why
he was particularly cautious at this intersection, defendant offers the following proffer of proof, and the witness would have testified as follows: 'I wasn't too much interested
in him' - referring to the defendant- 'until
the light turned red. Then I wondered who
was going to run it this morning. That's the
first thing I thought. I thought, 'Who's going
to run the red light this morning?'
"And further, 'Well, the light turned
green, and I got ready to move. And, of course,
as I moved, just as I started, I looked. I
thought, 'Well, who's coming?' And I saw
this truck coming, and I mentioned to my
wife, I said, 'Well, here goes another one. He
can have the right-of-way as far as I'm concerned.'
16
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"That's all.
"THE COURT: That is the proffer
that you tender, and do you want to hear it,
or do you have objections?
"MR. BLACK: What is that?
"THE COURT: I say that is his proffer. Do you want the jury to hear it, or do
you have objections to it?
"MR. BLACK: I object to it for the
same reason as stated before, that I think it
is immaterial.
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained. And you have a motion you want to
make.''
At the close of the State's case defendant made
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State
'failed to prove the commission of a crime and the
motion of the defendant was denied. Whereupon,
counsel for defendant made his opening statement.
At this point the court instructed the reporter not
to take down the opening statement made by Mr.
·McCullough. That opening statement becomes very
material at this point because of the effect of the
court's ruling in refusing to allow Mr. James Challis,
the City Traffic Engineer, to testify in behalf of
the defendant. At pages (R. 81-83) court stated:
"THE COURT: I'm not sure I am
going to let Mr. Challis testify to that effect,
Mr. McCullough, because I have ruled heretofore that that is immaterial. Whether a lot
17
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of other people have been negligent or ~heth~r
a lot of other people have run stop signs IS
no concern of ours. Whether this defendant
was negligent is a concern of ours; if he is
negligent, whether it is of such a grave. nat~re
as to constitute recklessness so as to bring him
within this charge; and I don't believe that
this jury or I would be interested in knowing
that on other occasions other people have done
the same thin'g. I think I would not take our
time on that.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, I think
the testimony that he can give with reference
to this intersection and subsequent changes
that have taken place are material and go to
the very issue that we are trying to decide,
this question of recklessness.
"THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to
let him tell about how many people have violated the law or whether or not they have
violated the law. I don't think that helps us
a hit. If there is anything peculiar about this
intersection or its timing that would help the
jury in determining whether this defendant
viola ted the law, then, of course, it would be
material; but just for us to get out and try
to determine whether other people were violating the law or not won't help us here. It seems
to me it is something like when a man is
charged with negligently shooting a deer hunter, and he could show every year so many deer
hunters get shot every year. We are not interested in that case. We are interested in
what happened in this case, and I will limit
you to this case.
''MR. McCULLOU'GH: Of course I
don't want to dispute the matter with Y~ur
18
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Honor since you have the last word anyway.
"THE COURT:

Well, I do temporarily.

"MR. McCULLOUGH: But if you are
going to limit it to that extent, the only issue
is if the light was red, the light was red when
he ran it, then he is guilty period.
"THE COURT: No, that is not quite.
My instructions will show that is not true.
There has got to be an element of recklessness
in here before this defendant is 'guilty.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, we will
proceed then, Your Honor. If that is going to
be Your Honor's ruling"THE COURT:

Yes.

"MR. McCULLOUGH: - of course,
we would like '''THE COURT: I am going to rule that
this jury has no interest in whether other
people have run lights because if we get that
before us, we have got to go into every case
to find out whether somebody else was negligent, and that is not - well, it seems to me
we would be here a month, and I had better
stop it before we get started.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: I would like the
record to show I would like to make a proffer
of proof, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: You may do that later."
The proffer of proof submitted by the defendant is contained at page R. 91 of the record:
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"MR. McCULLOUGH: Comes now the
defendant and offers the following proffer of
proof: That if the defendant's witness, Mr.
James W. Challis, city traffic enginee.r,. were
allowed to testify, he would have te;stif1ed as
follows: That the intersection at 21st South
and Ninth East for the year 1959 had the
second highest number of accidents per number of cars traveling through the intersection
of any intersection in Salt Lake City; that
for a number of years prior thereto and at
least five that this intersection has been one
of the ten intersections havin'g the highest
accident ratio in Salt Lake City; that as a
result of this accident ratio and studies with
regard to the intersection itself, the city installed in place of the single semaphore in
the center of the street a system of double
'Semaphores, that is, two semaphores for each
lane of traffic approaching the intersection
and that the semaphore that was installed at
the time of the accident was originally installed in 1935 and that since 1935 the lenses
used in these semaphores have been corrected
and perfected to eliminate the question of
sun phantom, that is, the inability of the
drivers to distingui'sh the red, yellow, and
green signal when the sun is shining directly
into them; that this semaphore had never
been changed in 'any way since 1'935 and still
contained the original lenses; that at the time
of the installation of the double system of
semaphores in December of 1959 an all-red
phase 'signal was installed, that is, that all
semaphores for traffic approaching in any of
the four directions are red at the same time
and maintain a red signal for a definite
len~gth of time; that these factors were found
20
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necessary to correct certain deficiencies existing at said intersection, said deficiences having been determined to exist by reason of the
prior accident rate and studies carried on in
the office of the traffic engineer of Salt Lake
City, Mr. James Challis; further that Mr.
James Challis would testify with reference to
the number of accidents which occurred at
this intersection in the year 1959, the total of
24 in all, to show their relationship to the
present or to the case at bar and the similarity
that existed between them, all of which were
factors which led the traffic engineer's office
to recommend and install the new double system of semaphores and new all-red phase
cycle at the intersection of 21st South and
Ninth East. Judge, you should have let it in.
"TI-IE COURT : Don't t a k e t h i s,
Mirm."
(Discussion off the record)
The record does not disclose the court's ruling
with reference to this proffer of proof. However,
the proffer of proof was refused by the court, and
Mr. James Challis, city traffic engineer, was not
allowed to testify to the matters set forth in the
proffer.
Defendant Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. testified
in his own behalf that on the 9th day of March,
1959, at approximately 7 :30 A.M. in the morning
(R. 83) he was proceeding on his way west on 21st
South to his employment (R. 84). Defendant Stewart testified as follows:
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"Q.

Will you tell us what happened.

"A. I left home at about seven fifteen
in the morning. I live above the Wasatch
Boulevard. I drove down to the boulevard and
on over to Parleys Way to a semaphore light
there down at 21st South, a semaphore light
at 21st East and another one down at 17th
East, another at 13th East, another at 1'1th
East; proceeded on down the street and came
to the Ninth Eiast intersection. As I approached it, the light was green, and the traffic was
stopped both sides of the road, at least there
was none - that was stopped on the south.
The north, I'm not sure whether they were
at the road or not, but there was no traffic
moving across the intersection. A car proceeded ahead of me going west, and I just
normally proceeded down the street, and just
as I got into the intersection a car come out
in front of me, and I hit it broadside.
"Q. Now, approximately how far back
from this intersection were you - can you
people hear him? If you can't raise your hand,
and we will have him speak a little louder.
Approximately how far back from the intersection were you, Leo, when you first saw
the light was green or was apparent that it
was green?
"A. Oh, it was green as I approached
from quite a little distance back, possibly a
half block back up the street.
"Q.
saw it?

Well, when was the last time you

"A. The last time I saw it was just before I got up to the intersection and entered
2_2
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the intersection. There comes a time when
it is no longer a problem of the light. There
wasn't time for it to go through a yellow cycle
and into a red cycle and plenty of time to go
across the intersection, and I went ahead.
"Q. Were there any other cars coming
from the south into the intersection?
"A. There was one car at the in tersection, and there was another car approaching
back behind that. In fact, I think there were
three cars. I'm not sure, but some of the cars
for some reason or other drew my attention
to that side. I don't know whether it was
movement of a car or what drew my attention to the side, and I looked to the left and
swung my eyes back to the right. There was
a car in front of me. I tried to stop and
couldn't."
Mr. Stewart further testified that after the
impact he went around the other side of the 'Plymouth automobile; that Mr. Weddington was just
outside of his automobile not more than two feet
(R. 85) from it (R. 86). That he immediately called
the service station attendant and then went to a
telephone booth to call an ambulance. Mr. Stewart
testified that prior to the entering of the intersection he was traveling approximately '25 m.p.h.; that
he had been coming through the various semaphores
going west on 21st South; that he did not believe
the semaphores he had come through were in a
;regular sequence (R. B6). Further, defendant Stewart testified ( R. 86) :
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"Q. As you approached this intersection
of 21st East and - 21st South and Ninth
East, will you tell me the position the sun
was in at that time?
"A. The sun had just come up. It was
at my back and had just come up.
"Q. And you are familiar with Parleys
Canyon there, are you not?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. Where was the sun in relation to
Parley's Canyon?
"A. Well, at that time of the year the
sun shines down through Parleys Canyon and
lights down earlier, a little earlier than it
does other parts of town, through Parleys
Canyon and Millcreek Canyon the same way.
The sun comes in quite a lot earlier.
"Q.

Does that shine down 21st South?

"A.

Yes."

Defendant Stewart further testified that as he
came into the intersection he did not accelerate his
vehicle to his knowledge except that possibly when
he went to stop his foot may have slipped off the
brake and hit the throttle; that this would have
occurred only at the point of impact and not prior
to the point of impact (R. 87). Defendant Stewart
testified at R. 87 and 88:
"A. No sir. There was no reason to accelerate. I don't speed up at intersections.
It is a normal ha:bi t to slow down.
24
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"Q. Was there anything to call your
attention to the fact that you did not have
the right-of-way through this intersection
that you could think of?

"A. Not a thing. It was a complete surprise to me when the car shot up in front of
me. I proceeded because I thought the intersection, the right-of-way was mine. I was
going on down the street."
On cross-examination Defendant Stewart testified ( R. 88) that he had taken this route on two or
three occasions prior to this; that he was aware of
the semaphore at the intersection of 9th East and
21st South and that there was a substantial amount
of traffic going in all directions. He further testified that he had a definite recollection of the light
being green at a distance of approximately 150 feet
back from the intersection or at the approximate
location in front of Petty Motor (R. 88):
"Q. Now, you have mentioned in your
direct examination the figure of 150 feet back
from the intersection. I take it that by that
you are testifying that back here 150 feet,
say probably somewhere in front of Petty
Motor, you have a definite recollection of
seeing the light green at that point. Is that
right?
"A. Well, I have no reason to make
150-foot estimate, but - I think it might be
wrong, but the light was green as I came up
to it, yes sir.
"Q. Well, you did m'ake that estimate
25
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right after the accident when the officer
talked to you, didn't you?
"A. Yes. I'm not sure whether it was
suggested or whether I just - came out of
blue sky or what, because there was no reason
to make any actual footage. You can't estimate distance that close. I was thinking of
the position that you are normally in when
you approach an intersection. There comes a
time when the light is in the center of the
street when you can no longer readily see
them. I don't know whether that is 100 feet,
1:50 or 70 feet, or some other distance."
Defendant Stewart testified that he did not
believe the light turned yellow while it was still
within his vision (R. 89). Further on cross-examination Defendant Stewart testified that there were
two cars on his right, one going around the corner
making a righthand turn, and the other he assumed
to be making a righthand turn because it was following the other car. That in his opinion the cars on
his right had not stopped ( R. 90). Defendant Stewart testified at R. 90:
"Q. It is your testimony that you never
did see a yellow light let alone a red light?
A. The yellow light didn't come on at
that time. If it did, I was fooled somehow,
because to my knowledge the light was green
up until the time"Q. At the time you saw the light was
green, you had no trouble at that time telling
it was green, did you?
"A. No sir."
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
THE CITY ENGINEER, JAMES CHALLIS, TO TESTIFY WITH RESPECT TO THE STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS AT THE PARTICULAR INTERSECTION
IN QUESTION TO SHOW THE DE'FECTIVE CONDITION OF THE SEMAPHORE.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
THE CITY ENGINEER, JAMES CHALLIS, TO TESTIFY WITH RESPECT TO THE STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS AT THE PARTICULAR INTERSECTION
IN QUESTION TO SHOW THE DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF THE SEMAPHORE.

The proffer of proof with respect to the proposed testimony of the Cit y Engineer, James Challis,
is set forth in full in the Statement of Fact and is
therefore not repeated here. It is defendant's contention that the refusal of the lower court to allow
the city engineer to testify as stated in the proffer
of proof was prejudicial error and the verdict of
the jury should be set aside.
Evidence of the defective condition of the light
semaphore, i.e., so called "sun phantom", was profferred by defendant to show that if defendant did
attempt to pass through a red light on the sema27
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phore there was not present the inattention, or
reckless disregard for the safety of others necessary
to complete the crime of negligent homicide.
In the case of Sinclair v. U. S., 265 F 991, 49
App DC 351, at page 992, Federal Reports, the
court states:
"We do not believe that there was any
fault on the part of the court in declining to
permit a witness to testify that he had observed other accidents at the place where this
occident occurred, and that he had one there
himself. Those accidents may all have been
the result of carelessness, and, if so, the fact
tlla t they took place would have no tendency
to prove that defendant was not negligent.
He was, however, permitted through a witness
to describe the condition of the street at that
point, and to say that there was 'a right mean
turn' there. This was proper as bearing upon
the question as to whether or not that condition of careless driving of the defendant was
the cause of the accident."
Evidence of similar accidents at this intersection to show a defective condition in operating equipmentis admissible.
Officer Johnson recognized the factor of "sun
phantom".
Defendant Stewart testified with respect to the
position of the sun, i.e., shining directly into the
semaphore; and that perhaps he was mislead by
the light.
28
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In the case of Parker v. Bamberger, et al, 100
Utah 361, 116 P 2d 425 (1941), it was alleged that
the accident was caused by the failure of the railroad to keep a wig-wag signal in proper repair so
that it would give reasonable warning of the presence of trains upon the tracks in the immediate
vicinity of the crossing. The court stated at page
369 of Utah Reports:
"With respect to the second alleged act
of negligence the trial court, over objection
df appellant's counsel, permitted evidence to
be introduced as to various failures of the
wig-wag signal to operate on occasions prior
to the accident. Certainly such evidence was
immaterial to show a defective signal device,
as well as to show the probability or the company having notice of such defect. Appellants
themselves in traduced evidence to show that
the device was not defective ·and that it was
kept in proper repair thus creating a conflict
in the evidence on this point. But evidence
of failures of the wig-wag to operate in the
past was material to show such a defective
condition of the signal as might explain its
operation on occasions testified to by appellants' witnesses, and failure to operate on the
occasions testified to by respondent's witnesses. Under the allegations of the complaint
and the issues in the case, all such testimony
with respect to the wig-wag signal tending
to establish that it was defective and failed
to operate at the time of the accident and that
the company knew or should have known of
such defective condition was properly admissible. Sargent v. Union Fuel Co., 37 Utah 392,
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108 P 928." See also 46 ALR 2d 936 for similar cases.
In the reverse situation it has frequently been
held that evidence of the absence of previous similar
accidnts at the same place where a plaintiff is injured in person or property is relevant and competent as tending to show that the conditions complained of were not so unreasonably dangerous as
to render a defendant liable for failing to correct
them.
The case of Stocker v. Ogden City, McFarland
v. Ogden City, 88 Utah 389, 54 P 2d 849 (1936)
was an action against the city for death of a resident from typhoid fever allegedly caused by drinking impure city water. The owner and manager of
a hotel, which took water from a creek at a point
where the water was alleged to be contaminated
and which was near the city's intake, and the city
health commissioner were competent to testify to
the absence of sickness among patrons of the hotel
who had drunk the allegedly contaminated water.
The court stated at page 402 of the Utah Reports
as follows:
"The chief objection argued is that the
fact of no sickness at Wheeler Creek 'could not
be pertinent to any issue in that ca:se,' that
'defendant might as well have called all the
other residents of Ogden and shown that they
did not get typhoid fever by drinking the
Ogden water,' and therefore argue that the
disease did not come from the water.
30
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"As we have already indicated, the source
of the disease is a question of fact, and from
the nature of the case the proof of necessity
must be wholly circumstantial. Direct and
positive evidence was not available. It is proper to receive evidence of all circumstances
which will tend to establish or to disprove the
source of the disease * * *" See also 31 ALR
2d 198 for cases in accord.
See also Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 U 320,
159 P 530 (1916) where it was held that evidence
that other persons had previously stumbled, though
had not fallen, over the projection in a sidewalk,
on which plaintiff had tripped, causing her to fall is
competent both as notice to the city, and as characterizing the defect. The court states at page 329
of Utah Reports:
"Counsel for defendant also insist that
the court erred in permitting plaintiff's witness to testify that they saw others persons in
passing over the projection trip, before the
plaintiff was tripped and fell. In that connection counsel contend that if the evidence had
shown that others had tripped and fallen, then
the evidence would have been competent, since
it would then have constituted notice to the
defendant that the defect was such as might
cause injury; but they contend, merely to show
that others in passing over the projection
stumbled and tripped has no significance for
the reason that it is a daily occurrence for
pedestrians to stumble or trip over very slight
defects. We think the evidence was proper.
Counsel's argument merely relates to the
31
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weight and not to the competency of the evidence. We think the evidence proper both as
to notice to the defendant and also as characterizing the defect * * *" See also 65 ALR
383 for other cases in accord.
See 20 Am Jur- Evidence- par. 304, page
282 - "Other Accidents and Injuries" :
"It is recognized in numerous cases that
for certain purposes at least, evidence of other
similar accidents or injuries at or near the
same place or by the use of the same appliance suffered by persons other than the plaintiff and at other and different times, not too
remote in point of time from the particular
occurrence, is admissible. Evidence of prior
accidents, when admissible, is generally admissible for the following purposes only: (1)
To show the existence of a defective or dangerous condition or appliance and the dangerous character of the place of injury or of the
machine or the appliance, and ( 2) to show
the defendants notice or knowledge thereof."
See 20 Am Jur -Edidence- par. 247, page
240, for a definition of relevancy:
"'Generally, it may be said that any legally competent evidence which, when taken
alone or in connection with other evidence,
affords reasonable inferences upon the matter in issue, tends to prove or disprove a material or controlling issue or to defeat the
rights asserted by one or the other parties,
and sheds any light upon or touches the issues
in such a way as to enable the jury to draw a
logic~l ~nfere!lce with respect to ~he principal
fact In Issue Is relevant and admissible."
32
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In Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., par.
9 I:
"None but facts having rational probative value are admissible. This principle is indeed axiomatic, for any system of evidence
purporting to be rational. It assumes no particular doctrine as to the kind of ratiocination
implied, - whether practical or scientific,
coarse and ready, or refined and systematic.
It prescribes merely that whatever is presented as evidence shall be presented on the hypothesis that it is calculated according to the
prevailing standards of reasoning, to effect
rational persuasion."
See Remy v. Olds, 4 Cal, unreported, 240, 34
P 216, 21 LRA 645, where one of the grounds urged
for reversing the judgment was the action of the
trial court in striking certain testimony as being
entirely collateral and having "no bearing on the
case." The reviewing court in discussing the question thus raised stated at page 246 of 4 Cal unreported at page 218 of 34 Pac.:
"That the evidence was upon a collateral
issue is not conclusive whether the fact it
tended to establish would tend to prove or disprove the fact at issue. Evidence is relevant
not only when it tends to prove or disprove
the precise fact in issue, but when it tends
to establish a fact which the existence or nonexistence of the fact in issue can be directly
_inferred."
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE.

A. Officer Johnson testified that he found a
Mr. Taylor, a witness to the accident; that in the
presence of Officer Johnson and Mr. Taylor and
Defendant Stewart, Mr. Taylor stated that "Mr.
Stewart had run the red light;" further Officer
Johnson testified that Mr. Stewart did not reply
or say anything to said remark made by Mr. Taylor.
('R. 39)

On cross examination ( R. 43) Officer Johnson
was asked the following question:
"Q. Did you ever have any other conversations with Mr. Stewart when Mr. Taylor
was present other than the one you just told
us about?
"A. Not that I can remember.
"Q. Do you remember Mr. Stewart, in
that conversation and in the presence of Mr.
Taylor, making a statement to this effect:
'That man ran the red light directly in
front of me, or something to that effect?'"
Objection was made by the state and the court
refused to allow him to answer.

Even Mr. Taylor admitted hearing Mr. Stewart
make such a statement (R. 55). For the court to
refuse to allow defendant to cross-examine Officer
Johnson was an unexplained silence on the part of
34
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defendant which could only be interpreted by the
jury as an admission by defendant, when such was
not the truth. Certainly defendant has the right to
!mpeach the witness if possible and to lay a foundation for such impeachment.
B.
asked:

On cross-examination Officer Johnson was

"Q. One other question, Officer Johnson, * * * this intersection at 9th East and
21st South is one of the most dangerous intersections in the city, is it not?"

The court refused to allow Officer Johnson to
answer that question ( R. 44).
Argument with respect to this point is adequately set forth in Point I and is therefore not repeated here.
C. On cross-examination of Mr. Hubbard, the
State's witness, the following question was asked
(R. 76):
"Q. Now, also, Mr. Hubbard, isn't it a
fact that you were particularly cautious of
this intersection because other cars prior to
this time had been running the light in front
of you at the intersection?
"A. No.
"Q. Let me call your attention to one
other factor in your deposition and see if this
doesn't refresh your recollection to * * *"
At this point the state objected and the court
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refused to allow defendant to impeach the witness,
by the use of a deposition taken in another case,
wherein he had testified to the contrary. (See proffer of proof (R. 80). That defendant has a right
to impeach the state's witness by referring to prior
statements is fundamental.
Further, Witness Hubbard's testimony in the
proffer of proof when considered with the excluded
testimony of the City Engineer, James Challis, is
explained and clearly admissible. See Point I for
argument- also 20 Am Jur (Evidence) par. 251,
page 245.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH
Attorney for Defendant
304 East 1st South
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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